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1“We need full and truthful information. And the truth should not depend upon
whom it has to serve. We can accept only the division into unoﬃcial information
(for the Comintern Executive only) and oﬃcial information (for everybody).”
Vladimir Lenin (1921).
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the new leader of the Soviet Union, faced a dilemma.1 Without al-
lowing some amount of free speech (glasnost), reforms of the highly ineﬃcient bureaucracy and
the command economy more generally seemed all but impossible. At the same time, free ﬂow of
information would undermine the very foundation of the Communist Party’s rule. Gorbachev’s
dilemma was not unique: every autocratic ruler has to provide incentives for his subordinates if
he wants to remain in power, and most of them fear free information as a threat to their political
survival. Even if an autocratic ruler has vast amounts of highly priced natural resources — as did
Mobutu Sese-Seko of Zaire, Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran, or the Soviet leadership throughout the
two decades prior to the abrupt fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s — he still faces an endogenous
constraint. The very same monitoring mechanism that provides proper incentives to his subordi-
nates — parliamentary opposition, free media, or NGOs — might allow his subjects to overcome their
coordination problems in organizing a revolt.
Gorbachev’s dilemma is also relevant in modern China. The trade-oﬀ between restricting in-
formation ﬂows to maintain political control and the need to use independent information sources
to provide proper incentives for the bureaucrats is well illustrated by the slow response of Chinese
state oﬃcials to the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). In the absence of
free media, incentives for lower-tier bureaucrats to provide suﬃcient eﬀort and transmit necessary
information to higher levels proved inadequate.2 While the ﬁrst information on SARS was received
1The words “Gorbachev dilemma” were ﬁrst used by Eugene H. Methvin as a title for the article in the National
Review (Dec. 4, 1987). The article starts “One swallow does not make a spring. And one prompt TASS report of
rioting in Central Asia does not make a free Soviet press. But among Kremlin watchers it is certainly a noteworthy
occurrence — as if, say, a California condor showed up at Capistrano.”
2A striking example of how a dictator can lose touch with reality in the absence of free media is the fall of the
Romanian dictator Ceau¸ sescu (Hardin, 1995, p.31). On December 21, 1989, after days of local and seemingly limited
unrest in the province of Timi¸ soara, Ceau¸ sescu called for a grandiose meeting at the central square of Bucharest,
apparently to rally the crowds in support of his leadership. In a stunning development, the meeting degenerated into
anarchy, and Ceau¸ sescu and his wife had to ﬂee the presidential palace, only to be executed by a ﬁring squad two
2by local political authorities in November 2002, there was no real action until at least the end of
March 2003. When on March 15 the World Health Organization issued a global warning on SARS,
the Chinese Propaganda Department prohibited Chinese media from reporting it (Washington Post
on May 13, 2003) On April 18, 2003 Time reported that Beijing public hospitals were trying to
conceal the extent of the disease by hiding or transferring patients during visits of WHO oﬃcials.
Saich (2003), in a week-by-week analysis of the story, attributes the slow reaction to bureaucratic
ineﬃciency and disincentives for local politicians to gather and transmit information to higher
levels.3
In our model, the ruler (either dictator or president, or even a collective body such as a par-
liament or a cabinet of ministers) chooses a policy which aﬀects both his own and his citizens’
interests. A policy succeeds only if it is properly implemented, which requires hiring a bureaucrat
who may either work or shirk. In order to induce high eﬀort, the ruler needs an agency to produce
information on the bureaucrat’s performance. We distinguish two cases: the case of a centralized
agency (“secret service”) and a decentralized one (“mass media”). The secret service can collude
with the bureaucrat and conceal evidence of the latter’s failure; preventing such collusion may be
very costly. In contrast, free media collect and distribute information on the bureaucrat’s per-
formance. (Of course, a media outlet might collude with the bureaucrat as well; the evidence of
postcommunist Russia certainly shows that the media are corruptible. Still, decentralized and free
media are much less likely to be engaged in all-encompassing collusion.) The downside of media
freedom is that the policy outcome becomes common knowledge to the public, which may threaten
the ruler’s position in power. Indeed, if the media report that the bureaucrat exerted a high level of
eﬀort, the public infers that it is the ruler who has low ability. Moreover, a negative media report
makes the low ability of the ruler common knowledge, which is critical for a successful revolution
(Tilly, 1978, Chwe, 2003).4
days later.
3“Once action is called for, the vertical and segmented structure of China’s bureaucracy hampers eﬀective action.
It is diﬃcult to gather information across diﬀerent sectors.” (“The Real Fallout From China’s Chernobyl”, Financial
Times, May 27, 2003.) Saich quotes a number of high-proﬁle publications by Chinese media, which operate under
tight political control, claiming that any information on the new disease is merely rumor. The Chernobyl disaster,
which occur on April 26, 1986, was not acknowledged by Soviet oﬃcials until two days later, when news already
spread across Western media.
4Free media is not the only mechanism for aggregating information which is dangerous to rulers. Only a few
autocrats allow free elections at the local level, decentralized NGO, or civil society. In this paper, we focus in
particular on media, but the trade-oﬀ we analyze extends to other institutions.
3As a result, for the more than half of the world population that lives in non-democratic regimes,
information is in especially scarce supply. The fact that rulers’ fear of media is justiﬁed might
be illustrated by the recent experience of “brinkmanship democracies,” which combine somewhat
free elections with somewhat independent media.“Color revolutions” in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine,
and Kyrgyzstan have taught (semi-)autocratic rulers around the world a lesson: even a partly
independent media might be crucial in defeating an attempt to falsify elections (McFaul, 2005,
Hill, 2005). McMillan and Zoido (2004) use evidence on bribes paid by the Peruvian government to
the country’s media to argue that the media were the major check on the government’s power. It
was TV journalists, rather than politicians or bureaucrats, to whom President Fujimori’s security
chief Montesinos paid the highest bribes. Eventually the only newspaper that remained independent
revealed the extent of the government’s corruption.
The trade-oﬀ between incentives for bureaucracy and the need to “divide and rule” by suppress-
ing information ﬂows is especially visible in developing countries with abundant natural resources.
The fact that such countries perform, on average, less successfully than resource-poor countries is
well-documented (see, e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1996, 1997a,b, Auty, 2001, Gylfason, Herbertsson
and Zoega, 1999, and Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006).5 The early literature on the “resource
curse” tracked the failure of growth-oriented strategies in resource rich-countries to the “Dutch dis-
ease” (see Sachs and Warner, 1996 and Krugman, 1987 for the theory of the long-term consequences
of the Dutch disease due to dynamic economies of scale). Yet, there is now an emerging consensus
that the major source of slow growth in resource-rich countries is institutions. The general mecha-
nism was described by North (1981, 1991) and, most recently, by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006);
the crucial role of institutions in generating the “resource curse” is analyzed in Lane and Tornell
(1996), Ades and Di Tella (1999), Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2004), and Mehlum, Moene, and
Torvik (2006). Still, these general insights do not explain the mechanics of the decision-making
process that leads to economically ineﬃcient policy choices.
In Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2004), the dictator uses resource rents to buy oﬀ political
challengers. However, the model stops short of explaining why buying oﬀ the political opposition
cannot be done simultaneously with carrying out a growth-enhancing policy. Our model demon-
strates that in the presence of abundant resources, it becomes less important to provide proper
5Ross (2001) notes that critical empirical contributions to the modernization debate by Przeworski and Limongi
(1993) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) did not consider oil-rich Midlle East states; in his own
regressions, A Middle East dummy is signiﬁcant and has a negative impact on democracy.
4incentives for bureaucrats, which in turn reduces the ruler’s willingness to have free media. Con-
sistent with our theory, non-democratic countries such as Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola,
and Saudi Arabia have vast resources and poor growth performance, while the Asian tigers of
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, while predominantly nondemocratic in 70s and
80s, have both high growth rates and scarce natural resources. These East Asian countries have
managed to establish an eﬀective meritocratic bureaucracy (Evans and Rauch, 1999, 2000; see also
Gehlbach and Keefer, 2006, on the role of institutionalized parties in autocracies). Again, it is
perhaps not coincidental that Gorbachev ultimately chose glasnost as the Soviet Union faced a
substantial decline in the price of oil,6 its major commodity export.
While not attempting to fully revise or replicate a vast empirical literature related to the debate
on autocratic modernization, we do check for empirical support for our ﬁndings.7 Country-level
evidence on the relationship between resource richness and media freedom seems to be consistent
with our model. Using Freedom House data on media freedom, Polity IV scores for democracy and
autocracy, and BP data on oil reserves, we show that, controlling for level of economic development
and democracy, the media are less free in oil-rich countries. This eﬀect is present in cross-section, in
two-stage least squares, and in panel regressions with country ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant, economically important, and robust to a variety of controls including literacy, Internet
penetration, country and population size, Gini index of inequality, and regional dummies. We also
show that — in line with our model — the eﬀect of natural resources on media freedom is especially
strong in less democratic countries. On the other hand, mature democracies do not suﬀer from an
adverse eﬀect of oil reserves.
Among those dictators that did not follow the democratization path, e.g. by lifting restrictions
on free media, there is a clear pattern. They create multiple security services, speciﬁcally designed
to spy on each other. The multiple security services are a somewhat intermediate solution, with the
costs and beneﬁts of both a single security service and competitive media. Making these security
services compete, a dictator reduces the danger of collusion between them and bureaucrats, but also
incurs a risk of information leakage to the public, not to mention substantial costs and delays. This
6While the policy of perestroika was proclaimed in 1985, it was not until 1987 that glasnost became popularized
and implemented on a large scale. In 1985—1986, the major stress was on uskorenie (modernization). To compare,
the sharp oil price drop occurred in 1986, which was also the year of the Chernobyl disaster.
7R e c e n te m p i r i c a lc o n t r i b u t i o n st ot h em o d e r n i z a t i o nd ebate include Epstein et al. (2004), Przeworski et al.
(2000) (see also Przeworski and Limongi, 1993) and Wantchekon (2004).
5was especially visible in “sultanistic regimes” (Chehabi and Linz, 1998) — examples include Idi Amin
in Uganda, Francisco Machas Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, Claude Duvalier in Haiti, Fulgencio
Batista in Cuba, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran, Mobutu in
Zaire, and Ferdinand Marcos in Philippines — which combined dictatorial oppression with dismal
economic performance. Chehabi and Linz (1998) speciﬁcally point out that such regimes were
especially likely to occur in resource-rich countries; under these regimes, the media were tightly
controlled, and bureaucratic eﬃciency was singularly low.
Investigating the interrelationship between media and bureaucratic incentives outside the de-
mocratic world, we draw upon three major strands in the economic literature. First, we use recent
advances in political economics with its emphasis on dynamic models of strategic interaction (see
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Acemoglu, 2006, Lagunoﬀ, 2006). Second, we employ insights from
contract theory and the corporate governance literature; providing incentives to subordinates is,
obviously, a major issue in this literature. Third, we relate our work to a rapidly growing literature
on the economics of media. Section 5 discusses the most relevant works in more detail.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model, while
Section 3 contains the analysis. In Section 4, we present empirical support for our theory. Section
5 contains the literature discussion. Section 6 concludes.
2S e t u p
In the model, time is discrete and inﬁnite, t =1 ,...∞, and population of the country constitutes
a unit continuum of individuals (citizens). There are rulers, which may be diﬀerent in diﬀerent
periods, and bureaucrats, selected by the ruler each period. There also might be an agency, either
media or a secret service, which monitors policy results. In each period, individuals observe personal
welfare (a private signal) and media broadcasts (a public signal), and decide whether or not to
revolt.
Dictators and Policy Choice
In each period, the ruler R chooses a policy. As the ruler is not competent in implementing the
policy, he hires a bureaucrat B. To monitor the bureaucrat, he also hires a secret service S or allows
free media M. The ruler may choose policies from policy space Pt consisting of right (π ∈ PR
t )a n d
wrong (π ∈ PW
t ) policies; in each period, the share of right policies is Pr
¡
π ∈ PR
t | π ∈ Pt
¢
= λ.
6The result of implementing a policy may either be a “success” or a “failure”. In the case of success,




of individuals by a ﬁxed amount h>0 (we may
interpret this as the expected discounted net present value of the increase) and does not change
the welfare of the rest. In the case of failure, the policy increases the welfare for only α < α of
individuals (by the same amount h). Those who beneﬁt from policy are drawn independently each
period, i.e. individual’s expected gains from policy success and failure are αh and αh, respectively.
In other words, each individual i gets a private signal si (t) ∈ {H,L} about policy outcome; ceteris
paribus, getting a high private signal increases the individual’s perception that policy resulted in a
success. We assume that a wrong policy necessarily fails; this assumption is a mere normalization
and may be relaxed. The outcome of a right policy may be either success or failure, and the
probability of success depends on the eﬀorts of the bureaucrat.
Rulers diﬀer in their ability to choose the right policy. Namely, each ruler gets information
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so the ability parameter a is the probability of getting the correct signal about a policy. We assume
that ability may be high (able ruler) or low (inept ruler), or, formally,
a ∈
½










the ruler knows his own ability.8 A st h ea b l e( a = aH =1 ) ruler perfectly distinguishes be-
tween right and wrong policies, he may choose a right policy with probability 1. The inept ruler
(a = aL) may mistakenly perceive a right policy as a wrong one and vice versa, so his chance of
choosing a right policy (i.e. the probability that the policy is right if ruler thinks it is right) is
ν ≡ aLλ
aLλ+(1−aL)(1−λ). Note that this probability increases both with λ (share of right policies) and
aL (ruler’s ability). Condition aL > 1
2 implies that ruler’s chance to choose a right policy is not
greater if he picks one that he perceives to be wrong.
We assume that the ruler gets instantaneous utility
Ut =( u − lI{policy fails})I{R stays in power} − [payments to B and S]
8This departs from Holmstrom’s (1999) model of career concerns where the ability is ﬁxed over time but known
neither to the player himself nor to the market. Given asymmetric information structure of this model, the ruler, the
bureaucrat and the citizens would update their beliefs about ruler’s ability diﬀerently. By allowing the ruler to know
his type (and assuming that the bureaucrat knows it as well) we are left with only citizens updating, which greatly
improves tractability.
7which means that he gets u>0 from being in power, but loses l<uif the policy fails. The ruler is
also responsible for payments to bureaucrat and (potentially) secret service (see later). Here I{A}
is the indicator function which takes the value of 1 i fa n do n l yi fA is true; otherwise, I{A} =0 .




where we assume that discount rate β incorporates the probability of the ruler’s death.
Bureaucratic Incentives
Each period, the ruler hires a bureaucrat to implement the policy. The bureaucrat may exert either
high or low eﬀort e ∈
©
eH,e Lª
. The cost of high eﬀort is c>0 while the low eﬀort is costless.
For simplicity’s sake, we assume a perfect complementarity between the bureaucrat’s eﬀort and the
ruler’s competent policy choice. If the policy is wrong, any eﬀort level results in a failure. If the
policy is right, the bureaucrat makes a diﬀerence: the policy succeeds if and only if the bureaucrat
chooses e = eH. While here we consider an extreme case where both the right policy and high
eﬀort on the part of the bureaucrat are critical for policy to succeed, our results also hold under
milder assumptions.
The bureaucrat maximizes his current period’s utility. Thus, to induce high eﬀort, the ruler has
to provide incentives, i.e. a higher salary in the case of success. The bureaucrat has limited liability,
so his wage cannot be negative. The bureaucrat chooses the eﬀort level, being fully aware of the
ruler’s ability a. However, if the ruler is inept, the bureaucrat does not know whether the policy he
is asked to implement is right. The ruler cannot observe the bureaucrat’s eﬀort. Policy outcome
is not directly observable either, but the ruler may use a third party to monitor the latter. In this
paper, we distinguish between two polar cases: fully decentralized monitoring, which corresponds
to free mass media (M), and a single monitoring agency, e.g. a secret service (S).
Media Freedom
In each period, the ruler chooses between free media and censorship (whenever he is indiﬀerent
between the two options, he prefers free media, e.g. as censorship has some implementation costs).
Under censorship, media is bound to publish good news, so citizens cannot distinguish between
good news dictated by censorship and good news due to successful implementation of the right
8policy. Individuals’ private signals do not allow them to make an unambiguous conclusion about
the quality of the policy. We assume, however, that censorship is imperfect, and there is a small
probability η>0 that mass media publish true information about poor policy outcome (e.g., there
may be disasters such as Chernobyl which are all but impossible to conceal). If the media are
free, they publish information that allows citizens to aggregate it and get correct perception on
how many people beneﬁted from policy in the current period. For the brevity’s sake we do not
model production of information by mass media and media competition explicitly.9 Free media
help the ruler monitor the bureaucrat but also increase the chances that the ruler loses his job.
Indeed, upon aggregating information, citizens might conclude that the policy failed due to the
ruler’s incompetence, and he thus should be replaced.
As an alternative to the free media, the dictator may monitor the bureaucrat with the help of
a secret service. If the ruler intends to use the secret service, he must pay it at least σ>0 to cover
the secret service’s cost of gathering information (it’s natural to think that mass media also bear
this cost, but are reimbursed by advertisers). The beneﬁt of the secret service is that it reports to
the ruler but not to the general public; there is no competitive pressure. However, the very same
beneﬁt creates a potential for collusion with the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat may oﬀer a bribe
to the secret service for not reporting his failure. This would be impossible in the case of media
where the competition and the free-rider problem would not allow such contracting. We assume
that evidence of policy failure may be concealed by secret service but may not be forged,10 so the
bureaucrat only has incentives to bribe when he fails.
Citizens
At the end of each period, each individual i in the population learns two things: a private signal
si (t) (whether her payoﬀ increased as a result of the policy or not) and a public signal spub (t)
(whatever is published in the media). At the end of each period, each citizens decides whether to
participate in a revolt against the ruler in order to replace him with a new one (of a random type).
A revolt succeeds once suﬃciently many citizens (share γ ∈ (1 − α,1)) decide to participate in it
9One could consider a monopolistic competition model where information acquisition is cheap (recall that each
media uncovers a part of the puzzle only) but not free, media outlets invest in it if they compete, because if they
don’t they will eventually be out of business, and in the presence of censorship they do not invest because they do
not have any incentives to do so.
10This prevents abuse of the bureaucrat who exerted e = e
H by the secret service.
9and that participating in an unsuccessful revolt costs r>0.
Potentially, citizens face collective action and free-rider problems; while we are not to develop a
full-scale theory of collective action, we are going to impose a few (natural) assumptions on citizen’s
behavior that would restrict the set of equilibria.
Citizen i maximizes her expected welfare
∞ X
τ=t
β(τ−t)Et (h(α − (α − α)I{policy fails}) − rI{i participates in unsuccessful revolt}).
We assume that the decision whether to participate in a revolt at period t is made in two steps.
First, the citizen uses all the available information (public and private in current and previous
periods) to evaluate the conditional probability that the current ruler is able, and thus whether
she would want him replaced with a random one. She ﬁrst decides whether wants the ruler to be
replaced. If she wants to replace the ruler the evaluates the costs and beneﬁts of participating in a
revolution, and makes the decision on whether or not to revolt.11 We make the following assumption
on the citizens’ ability to overcome collective action problem: If it is common knowledge that at
least γ citizens want to replace the ruler, the ruler is replaced. Those who want to replace the
ruler, revolt and do not bear the cost r, so that the taking part in the revolt is a utility-maximizing
strategy.12
Timing
The timing of events in the stage game is as follows. (See Figure 1.)
1. The ruler hires a bureaucrat, picks a policy, chooses the degree of media freedom (free or
censored, and makes contracts with both the bureaucrat (payments wF and wS which depend
11The assumption on the sequence of decisions by the citizen rules out equilibria where, say, everyone revolts after
ﬁfth period of current ruler’s tenure regardless of policy and signals.
12Persson et al. (2000) solve the collective action problem diﬀerently by assuming that voters are allowed to
coordinate their voting strategies (which correspond to actions in this context) ex ante, in a way that provide best
incentives for politicians. In their model, this coordination also serves as a commitment device to punish (or not
punish) politicians. While our main results would not change if we followed this path, we think that the assumption
that we make, i.e. that citizens’ actions are optimal ex post rather than ex ante, is more reasonable. Actually, in
Persson et al. (2000), voters are allowed to somehow decide on common strategy ex ante, but not ex post so that
voters are not able to renegotiate. In our setup, the only question that a citizen should answer when making decision
to revolt is whether she would want to see ruler deposed if she had publicly available information only and whether
her desire to revolt is shared by the others.
10on the report of media or the secret service) and the secret service (payments zF and zS which
depend on the service’s report).
2. The bureaucrat chooses the eﬀort level.
3. The policy outcome is realized, and each citizen learns his/her individual payoﬀ.
4. Mass media publishes the true outcome if it is free and censored news (policy success) if it is
not. If the secret service is hired, the secret service learns policy outcome. It then bargains
with the bureaucrat over the information that it will deliver to the ruler (bureaucrat makes
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the secret service). The secret service reports to the ruler.
5. The ruler pays the bureaucrat and the secret service according to the contracts.
6. Citizens decide whether or not to revolt, depending on information available.
Equilibrium concept and assumptions
The game is truly dynamic, and there are multiple individuals having asymmetric information
(especially if media are not free). The concept that has been widely used in recent works of,
e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Lagunoﬀ (2006), the Markov Perfect Equilibrium, is not
applicable here, because payoﬀ-relevant variables may include all private signals that individuals
got during the reign of the current ruler. On the other hand, the set of all subgame perfect equilibria
is too large, which necessitates a reﬁnement. We restrict analysis to equilibria which are stationary
in the sense that a ruler’s strategy, which includes a choice of an incentive scheme and contracts
with bureaucrat and/or secret service, depends only on ruler’s type. This simpliﬁes the analysis
as we do not need to analyze of certain counter-intuitive oﬀ-equilibrium paths; in our equilibrium,
the ruler’s strategy is still the best response given his complete information set.
We do not require stationarity of citizens’ strategies, so that they can accumulate past private
and public signals. We consider equilibria where able rulers (a = aH) choose high-powered incen-
tives for the bureaucrat; for such equilibria to exist, it is suﬃcient to require that the bureaucrat’s
cost of eﬀort is lower than the beneﬁt of successful implementation of the policy to the ruler:
c<l .( 1 )
As we see below, this assumption assures that the ruler’s beneﬁts of high eﬀort choice l are higher
than the cost of providing high powered incentives c. The assumption holds whenever bureaucrat’s
11 
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Figure 1: The stage game.
12eﬀort is not too costly (c is not too high) and/or the policy outcome does matter for the ruler’s
welfare (l is large).
We also assume that γ is suﬃciently high so that if the policy is always successful, there will
be no revolt. We need to make sure that share of those who received negative private signals in
excess of the average negative private signals is not suﬃcient to initiate a revolt. Formally, for all







αn−j (1 − α)
j <γ .( 2 )
For any α and γ>1















For small n, this need not be true due to discreteness of binomial distribution of private signals.13
It is also easy to show that (2) is always true if α>1
2 and γ ≥ 3
4.
3A n a l y s i s
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we study the behavior of media and the security service
g i v e na ni n c e n t i v es c h e m es e tb yt h er u l e r . T h en we compute how much it costs the ruler to
implement a high-powered or low-powered incentive scheme for the bureaucrat, ignoring for a
moment potential eﬀects on the probability of remaining in power. After that we proceed with
equilibrium responses of the citizens to diﬀerent reports by the media. Finally, we ﬁnd out how
ruler’s choice of media freedom depends on the parameters of the model.
Bureaucrat, Media, and Secret Service
We begin by studying the equilibrium behavior of the secret service and the bureaucrat in the
absence of free media. Clearly, if the secret service learns that the policy succeeds, it cannot report
13The left-hand side tends to 1/2 as n →∞ for any α ∈ (0,1); however, non-monotonically and non-uniformly (just
pointwise). It depends on α non-monotonically, too (it is decreasing, but has upward jumps due to discreteness).
Basically, the problem is as follows: suppose α =0 .52 and α =0 .51. Then after two periods of policy success, almost
75% of people (those who got two negative signals and those who got one positive and one negative signal) increase
their probability that the ruler is inept (two diﬀerent signals are more likely under inept ruler). This is certainly an
implication of discreteness.
13a policy failure; by assumption a failure cannot be forged. If it learns about a failure, it compares
the bribe b oﬀered by the bureaucrat with the diﬀerence of its payoﬀs, zF − zS, in cases it reports
a failure or a success. Therefore, the secret service reports a failure if and only if there is indeed
a failure, and the bribe oﬀer by the bureaucrat does not exceed its marginal payoﬀ for reporting
failure, i.e. b ≤ zF − zS.
The bureaucrat B knows this, and thus, should the policy fail, he is willing to bribe the secret
service by oﬀering the minimal bribe b = zF − zS as long as it is proﬁtable for him. If he bribes
the secret service, he gets wS from the ruler, and if he does not, he gets wF. In other words, if
bureaucrat’s wage depends on the secret service’s report, he oﬀers a bribe if and only if zF − zS ≤
wS−wF; the size of the bribe then equals wS−wF. One direct implication is that if the ruler wants
to implement truth-telling by the secret service in the absence of free media, he should satisfy the
collusion-proofness constraint:
zF − zS ≥ wS − wF (3)
which will hold as an equality in an equilibrium provided that the ruler minimizes his costs. An
alternative way to understand this constraint is to compare the joint surplus of the bureaucrat-
secret service coalition in the case of truthfully reporting failure and colluding to report success:
collusion-proofness requires wF + zF ≥ wS + zS.
The above intuition is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 To induce a low-powered incentive scheme, the ruler oﬀers wF = wS =0to the
bureaucrat regardless of his own ability; he also does not allow free media and provides no incentives
to the secret service zF = zS =0 . To induce a high-powered incentive scheme in the presence of
free media, the ruler chooses (wF,w S)=( 0 ,c) if he is able and (wF,w S)=( 0 ,c/ν) if he is inept.
To provide high-powered incentives without free media, the ruler oﬀers the same contract to the
bureaucrat, while his equilibrium payment to the secret service is zS =0 , zF = wS;w i t hs u c h
payment schedules, there is no collusion between bureaucrat and secret service.
All proofs are relegated to Appendix.
Like in conventional models of collusion in a three-tier hierarchy (e.g. Tirole, 1992), there is no
collusion in equilibrium. However, the risk of collusion incurs non-trivial costs: the need to provide
collusion-proof incentives (3) distorts ruler’s payoﬀs. If there were no threat of collusion, the ruler
would pay wS in case of success, and nothing in case of failure (which occurs in equilibrium at
14least with probability ν for an inept ruler). To ensure collusion-proofness, the ruler has to pay wS
whatever the outcome is.
The Ruler and the Citizens
In an equilibrium where able rulers always choose high-powered incentive scheme for the bureaucrat,
their policy is a success with probability 1: able ruler necessarily chooses the right policy, and
bureaucrat exerts e = eH. Consequently, media reports policy success regardless of whether it is
free or censored. On the other hand, an inept ruler faces a non-zero chance of policy failure to be
reported by the media: With probability 1 − ν>0, he chooses a wrong policy which eventually
fails, and the media reports this with probability 1 if it is free and η>0 if it is not. Therefore,
citizens observing public signal spub = L in period t are bound to believe, regardless of their previous
information, that the ruler is inept.
Since we consider equilibria where rulers of the same type always choose the same policy,
citizen’s expected utility depends on the ruler’s type only. Policy of an able ruler never fails while
that of an inept ruler has a non-zero chance of failure, so citizens strictly prefer able ruler to inept
ones and want the ruler to be replaced if and only if they believe the current ruler to be able with
probability less than µ. In particular, after getting a negative public report spub = L, each citizen
not only believes that the ruler is inept for certain, but it is common knowledge that everyone
wants the ruler replaced. Hence, after a negative media publication the ruler is indeed replaced,
which makes free media dangerous for an inept ruler.
Given this result, the fact that the ruler stays in power implies that all previous media reports
during his tenure have been positive. Suppose that so is current media report, so spub = H.A
citizen, given public and private information, may or may not be willing to have the ruler replaced.
However, as the following proposition shows, no citizen is sure that at least ξ of them want the
ruler replaced.
Proposition 2 Consider a ruler who had only positive media reports until period t.T h e ni np e r i o d
t each citizen, given information available, assigns a strictly positive probability to the event that
less than γ other citizens want the ruler replaced, and thus there is a positive chance that revolt
will not succeed.
One may compare this result to winner’s curse phen o m e n o ni na u c t i o n sw i t hc o m m o nv a l u e s .H e r e ,
each citizen gets a stream of private signals about the same variable (ruler’s ability). When a citizen
15becomes just ready to revolt, she believes that most other citizens lag behind her in their conﬁdence
that the ruler is inept, because otherwise the revolt would have already occurred before. As long
as media reports policy success, citizens are unable to transfer negative information to each other,
and at any given moment they are too afraid to initiate a revolt. However, if media reports policy
failure, it immediately becomes common knowledge that the ruler is inept, and citizens become
able to coordinate.
This establishes a proposition on the rulers’ succession.
Proposition 3 The ruler stays in power as long as the media report “success”. If media report
“failure”, citizens revolt, and the ruler is replaced by a new one.
The intuition is straightforward. Upon a positive report citizens update their beliefs on the
probabilities of the two outcomes: (i) the ruler may be able and media are free (ii) the ruler is
inept but media are controlled. As in the case (ii) there is a non-trivial probability η of leakage
of negative information, the positive report shifts the citizens’ ex post beliefs in favor of (i). Any
single negative report, however, informs the citizens that the ruler is inept and is therefore inferior
to an average pick from the rulers’ pool next period; hence the current ruler is replaced.
Media and the Choice of Bureaucratic Incentives
We now check that an able ruler indeed chooses the high-powered incentive scheme if assumption
(1) holds.
Proposition 4 At any period of his tenure, an able ruler is strictly better oﬀ allowing free media
and choosing a high-powered incentive scheme. His expected life-time utility is U = 1
1−β (u − c).
The inept ruler faces a far more complex trade-oﬀ: he needs to choose high- or low-powered
incentives, and the monitoring mechanism. The ruler never chooses free media together with low-
powered incentive scheme thus only three options remain: (i) high incentives and free media (denote
this choice M); (ii) high incentives and censored media (we denote this choice S as the ruler relies
on the secret service); (iii) low incentives (L).
16Then the ruler’s expected utility at the beginning of a period when he is in power by U is as
follows
U =m a x( UM,U S,U L);w h e r e
UM = u − (1 − ν)l − c + βνU;
US = u − (1 − ν)l − c/ν − σ + β (1 − η(1 − ν))U;
UL = u − l + β (1 − η)U.( 4 )
Denote solutions to equation UX (U)=U by UX,w h e r eX ∈ {M, S, L}.R e g i m eX is chosen
whenever UX is the greatest of the three: for example, if UM > US and UM > UL, then, since

















so U = UM is the solution to the problem; all other cases may be considered in the same way.
Rearranging the terms, we obtain the solution:
UM =




u − (1 − ν)l − c/ν − σ




1 − β (1 − η)
.
Proposition 5 Free media is more likely to be chosen when the beneﬁto fs t a y i n gi no ﬃce u is
low, the value of a good policy l is high, or the cost of secret service σ is high. If free media is not
chosen, secret service is more likely to be used to induce high eﬀort if desire to stay in oﬃce is high,
value of the good policy l is high, the cost of secret services σ is low, or the cost of bureaucrat’s
eﬀort c is low.
Let us also discuss the comparative statics with regard to utility of holding oﬃce u. Whenever
u is very large, then the ruler will choose secret service. The reason is that he then pays attention
only to his chances of staying at power, and these are maximized if S is chosen (free media M are
deﬁnitely dominated, and, ceteris paribus, it makes sense to give high incentives to the bureaucrat
so that some evident disaster that the media will report will be postponed for as long as possible).
Another dimension of interest is ν, which captures both inept ruler’s ability aL and the share
of good policies λ, which may be a proxy for overall economic situation. The comparative statics
here is more involved. Namely, as ν increases, it becomes more proﬁtable (and cheaper, in case of
secret service) to choose high incentives, so the chance that low incentive regime L will be chosen
17diminish. There, however, remains a non-trivial trade-oﬀ between M and S:w i t hh i g h e rν,t h e
ruler faces a lower chance of policy failure which makes him less afraid of choosing free media; on
the other hand, higher ν decreases the diﬀerence between free media and secret service in terms of
expected payments to B and S,w h i c hm a k e sS more attractive. Overall, the statics is ambiguous,
but one can prove that UM is convex, while US is concave (if η is small) with respect to ν,s o
UM − US is a convex function which means that secret service dominates other options for some
intermediate values of ν. Both very low and very high ν may make mass media superior to secret
service (of course, depending on other parameters, one or both of these intervals may shrink); note,
however, that for low ν both free media and secret service are dominated by low incentives regime.
Robustness
While we introduced a number of simplifying assumptions to make the model tractable, results
seem to be robust to the modelling choices. For example, suppose that smart rulers also make
mistakes albeit with a lower probability. The results still hold even though Bayesian updating will
be somewhat more involved. In particular, citizens would allow rulers to remain in power after
occasional policy failures; however even smart rulers can be overthrown upon a series of mistakes
due to bad luck. Interestingly, in such a setting, there is a case for the smart ruler to choose free
media over the secret service even if the secret service is costless (σ =0 ) . Indeed, if the smart
ruler expects some chances of mistake, he will have to pay a bonus to the secret service to prevent
collusion; this bonus is not needed if the monitoring is carried out by free media.
We have assumed that the ruler does not punish the bureaucrat for the policy failure even when
the ruler knows that the policy choice was right (e.g. because the ruler is able) and the failure is
B’s fault (this only happens out of equilibrium); he needs an outside veriﬁcation of the negative
outcome — either by the secret service or by the media. If we extend the model to the case of
non-trivial probabilities of success in case of wrong policy choice or low eﬀort, this would not be a
problem — either success or failure may occur even if the bureaucrat works hard.
Yet another extension would be a departure from the assumption that bureaucrats work for
R only for one period. If there is a multi-period contracting environment, the ruler can oﬀer
the bureaucrat long-term incentives. In particular, the bureaucrat might be oﬀered a deferred
compensation — a tenure premium, pension, or even a stake in a property controlled by the ruler —
that will only be paid if the ruler himself remains in oﬃce. This can result in an emergence of crony
18capitalism where the incentives of the ruling elite are based on the legitimacy of their well-being
which is in turn contingent on the regime’s stability.
In our model, we have also neglected the cost of ruler turnover. In many cases dismantling a
dictatorship imposes substantial costs on the economy and the society. If these costs are substantial,
out analysis would go through as long as the beneﬁts of replacing an inept ruler (1 − ν)(α − α)h
are suﬃciently high.
Each citizen updates her beliefs based on both public and private information. If the latter is
consistently negative, the citizen knows that there is a high chance that the ruler is inept. However,
he will never be certain that many others know it as well. Hence, a revolt would fail with a non-
trivial probability. Since there are individual losses but no individual gains from revolution, the
revolt will be delayed until the negative information becomes public. This result follows from the
absence of personal returns to revolting. The result will change if the revolution leader receives
private beneﬁts if the revolution succeeds. Then, for some parameter constellations, revolution can
happen even if the media only runs positive news.
Empirical Predictions
The model generates a number of testable predictions about determinants of media freedom. We
argue that high u (or low l) may be associated with abundance of natural resources, since more
resources imply that the adverse eﬀect of a wrong policy may be mitigated by availability of
petrodollars. Figure 2 presents the comparative statics with regard to high u (or low l).
In a democracy, the ruler and his bureaucracy are bound to cope with free media. Thus, we do
not expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀect of natural resources on media freedom in democratic countries
where monitoring of bureaucracy is carried out via separation of powers, opposition parties etc.
The eﬀect of media freedom on economic performance is ambiguous. The free media give rise to a
higher turnover of inept leaders which should promote both a good policy and better bureaucratic
incentives therefore resulting in economic growth. However, the cost of turnover may have an
adverse aﬀect on growth (e.g. via expropriation of property and macroeconomic instability).
Proposition 5 implies that extra oil reserves have unambiguous eﬀect on media freedom: indeed,
both higher desire desire to stay in power (high u) and low interest in policy success (low l)m a k e
less free media optimal for the ruler. However, oil may have ambiguous impact on the incentives
provided to bureaucrats, and thus probably economic performance. Indeed, as we saw, if the ruler is














































Figure 2: Comparative statics of the ruler’s choice of incentives and monitoring mechanism with
regard to the resources abundance: indiﬀerence to policy outcomes (low l, vertical axis) and high
value of holding oﬃce (high u, horizontal axis).
not much interested in policy success, he will rank low incentives higher then the other two options.
However, if the oil does not decrease his interest in outcome, but at the same time increases his
desire to stay in power (l is constant but u is high), then, as Proposition 5 suggests, the ruler will
choose secret service. The intuition is that he will then try to accomplish two goals, so that both
policy outcome is more likely to be success and the chances of revolution are minimal, even despite
the necessity of bearing higher costs. Therefore, our model predicts ambiguous eﬀect of resource
abundance on economic performance (although presence of oil and choosing of secret service instead
o ff r e em e d i aa sar e s u l tm a ys l o wd o w nt h et u r n o v e ro fr u l e r sa n dm a k ei tl e s sl i k e l yt h a ta na b l e
ruler will come to power soon).
204 Evidence
In this section, we illustrate the theory above with systematic evidence on the relationship betweeen
oil and media freedom using cross-sectional and panel data. To check the main testable prediction
(oil has adverse eﬀect on media freedom in non-democracies), we need data on natural resources,
level of democracy, media freedom and long-run economic performance. Unfortunately, systematic
data on media freedom are not available prior to 1993, so we can check to what extent the eﬀect of
resource abundance on media freedom and bureaucratic incentives slows down long-run economic
growth. We will therefore concentrate on the factors determining media freedom itself.
While we focus on testing our prediction that natural resource abundance undermines media
freedom in non-democratic societies, we also control for alternative theories. First, there is a positive
correlation (and a two-way casualty) between media freedom and the level of democracy per se.
In our empirical analysis we show that natural resources are a signiﬁcant determinant of media
freedom even controlling for the level of democracy. Second, media freedom is a “normal good”
and should therefore be positively associated with the level of development (aﬄuent citizens demand
better media) and negatively correlated with resource abundance. In this story, the resource-rich
dictators simply have enough means to pay citizens for banning free media, while dictators with no
resources at hand are forced to allow free media. We show that our results hold even if we control
for the GDP per capita, for literacy, internet penetration, and for inequality. We also show that
media freedom is negatively associated with literacy which is consistent with our model but is at
odds with the “demand for media” theory.
Data
We use several sources of data. As a proxy for media freedom we use Press Freedom index available
from Freedom House. Although certain information on media freedom is available for years as early
as 1979, detailed data are unavailable until 1993, so we use only data for years 1993—2004. Press
Freedom is constructed by Freedom House as an integer from 0 to 100,w i t h0 corresponding to
ideally free media and 100 corresponding to no media freedom. However, to facilitate interpretation
we use (100− Freedom House Index) as a measure of media freedom, so in this section, greater
media freedom index corresponds to freer media. Note that Freedom House data captures both
printed and broadcast media.
We used the democ variable from Polity IV dataset as a proxy for the degree of Democracy.
21The variable ranges from 0 to 10 where 10 corresponds to perfect democracy. In some cases, democ
variable is assigned −66, −77,o r−88 value; this corresponds to missing data or political turmoil
in a given country and year. We exclude such data from our dataset.
A number of papers (e.g., Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006, Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004,
and Ross, 2001) proxies the resource endowments on growth by using the share of natural resources
in GDP or exports. Unfortunately, these variables may be highly endogenous with respect to both
growth (or growth opportunities) and institutions. In fact, since mining industry does not usually
require much human capital (and if it does ,i tm a yb ev e r yw e l lp r o v i d e db yf o r e i g nﬁrms), the
share of mining industry in GDP is actually a proxy for underdevelopment. For instance, the U.S.
are well-endowed with natural resources, including oil, but mining and drilling comprise for a small
part of GDP as other industries are highly developed as well. Moreover, high resource exports may
also be, for any given resources endowment, a proxy for lack of growth opportunities: the lack of
internal demand for fuels makes producers export them.
We proxy resource endowment by the proven oil reserves which are presumably exogenous.
While investment in geological exploration aﬀects this variable, these investments need not depend
on the level of economic development. Even if investment in exploration depend on country’s level
of development, it is more plausible that well-developed countries have had more time and resources
to invest. Thus, ceteris paribus, proven reserves should be higher in well-developed countries; hence,
this eﬀect would only bias our estimates towards null eﬀect. (Our results are robust to use of oil
production instead of oil reserves in regressions.)
We focus on oil as it is by far the most important natural resource (Tsui, 2005), reliable data
on oil reserves and production are easily available, and it is globally-traded (unlike, e.g., natural
gas). Countries diﬀer in terms of the extraction costs but the data on the latter are less reliable;
also these diﬀerences matter less in panel data regressions. We use data from Statistical Review of
World Energy 2005, available on the BP’s web-site (http://www.bp.com). This Statistical Review
contains only data for countries which have positive oil reserves or produce a positive amount of
oil; therefore, we assumed trivial oil reserves and production for other countries, unless explicitly
stated that data are not available.
Finally, we use data on GDP per capita (purchasing power parity), population and land area
from the World Development Indicators.
22Results
The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix. These results are consistent with
the model’s predictions, and are robust to the choice of speciﬁcation, econometric methodology,
and sample. Controlling for the level of development (proxied by GDP per capita in purchasing
power parity) and the level of democracy, media freedom is negatively correlated with oil reserves
(column (1)). This correlation is stronger in the less democratic countries. In column (2), we
add an interaction term between democracy and oil reserves; not only the coeﬃcient at the oil
reserves remains negative and signiﬁcant, but the coeﬃcient at the interaction term is positive and
signiﬁcant. The less developed is the democracy, the stronger the negative eﬀect of oil reserves on
media freedom.
We also control for the country size both in terms of land area and population. The former
may be related to the costs of monitoring the bureaucracy, the latter may reﬂect the importance
of media as coordination device. The coeﬃcient signs are consistent with our model. The larger
the land area, the harder it is for the ruler to monitor his bureaucracy, hence a greater need for
media freedom. The more populous the country the harder it is for people to coordinate without
media; hence media is vital for overthrowing the ruler so the ruler prefers censorship. Including
the country’s population into the regression also helps assuring that we control for oil reserves per
capita as well as the total oil reserves; similarly, we eﬀectively control for the share of reserves to
GDP as we include logarythms of the total reserves, GDP per capita and population.
In column (3), we control for literacy, internet penetration and inequality (captured by the Gini
coeﬃcient). While the sample size is reduced, our results still hold. It is interesting that literacy
has a negative eﬀect on media freedom: the more literate is the population, the costlier is the free
media for the ruler. This is consistent with our model rather than with the alternative theory that
the freedom of media emerges in response of public demand; this theory would imply a positive
sign. One should also note that including internet and literacy changes the sign of the coeﬃcient
at the GDP per capita — indeed, it is the technological development and education rather than
economic wellbeing per se that drives the choice of media freedom.
In column (4), we run the regression for the countries with non-trivial oil reserves and also obtain
similar results. OLS regressions (1)-(4) are vulnerable to an endogeneity problem as democracy can
depend on media freedom. In regressions (5), we replace contemporaneous measures of democracy
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Figure 3: Adjusted partial residual plot for media freedom and oil reserves for countries with
non-trivial oil reserves (speciﬁcation 4 in Table 1).
democracy score and the results remain the same. In columns (7) and (8) we use panel data for
1993-2004. First, we use country-level ﬁxed eﬀects (column (7)); we also include time dummies to
control for changes in global oil price and other global variables. In column (8) we estimate the
random eﬀects model controlling for clustering at the country level.
In all speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients at oil reserves and the interaction term between oil and
democracy are signiﬁcant and robust; they also have similar values across all speciﬁcations. The
results are also robust to adding controls such as Gini, education, replacing oil reserves with oil
production. The eﬀect is not driven by any single country or even region — we have tried to exclude
all regions and individual countries one by one and the coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant and had
similar values. In panel regressions the results are also robust to excluding outlier observations.
The eﬀects are not only statistically but also economically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃc i e n t- 4a tt h e
LogOilReserves implies that in a non-democratic country, a two-fold increase in oil reserves results
in 4*ln(2)=2.8 change in media freedom score. Figure 3 presents the partial residual plot for media
24freedom and oil reserve (adjusted for other independent variables) which shows that the diﬀerence
in media freedom e.g. between United Arab Emirates and Mexico is explained by the respective
diﬀerence in oil reserves. The coeﬃcient 0.4 at the interaction term implies that the relationship
between oil and media freedom weakens and eventually disappears as democracy score increases
from 0 to 4/0.4=10 which is the level of democracy in OECD countries. This is fully consistent with
our interpretation that media are crucial for bureaucratic incentives in the absence of separation
of powers, opposition parties or other mechanisms present in democratic societies.
Table 2 presents further robustness checks. Instead of including the interaction term, we run
the OLS regression for democratic and non-democratic countries separately. Columns (1) and (2)
in Table 2 present the results for the democracy threshold of democ =8 . The countries at this
threshold are Brazil, Latvia, and Philippines. Other thresholds yield similar results. Oil reserves
negatively aﬀect media freedom in non-democratic countries only.
Regression (3) replaces oil reserves with oil production. In regression (4), we use the media
freedom index from Reporters Sans Frontieres rather than the more conventional one from the
Freedom House. Column (5) presents the results of the regression with instrumental variables
for the sample of non-democratic countries. In all the samples and speciﬁcations the results are
consistent with our model’s predictions.
5 Related Literature
For our study, three major strands in modern economic literature are most relevant: (i) dynamic
models of strategic interaction in political economics, (ii) contract theory and corporate governance,
and (iii) economics of media.
Recent formal work on political dynamics of non-democratic regimes includes, among others,
Acemoglu (2003, 2005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Kon-
rad and Skaperdas (2005), Restrepo (2002), and Gallego and Pitchik (2004). Acemoglu (2003)
demonstrates that the impossibility of political commitment precludes eﬃcient political outcomes.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model political replacement process as, essentially, a two-player
game between the rich and the poor, while Acemoglu (2005) investigates outcomes of oligarchic
decision-making. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) analyzes succession process within a framework
of dynamic coalition formation, while Konrad and Skaperdas (2005), Acemoglu, Robinson, and
Verdier (2004) and Padro-i-Miguel (2005) study divide-and-rule tactics of leaders in non-democratic
25regimes. The literature on optimal sequencing between economic and political liberalization is dis-
cussed in Persson and Tabellini (2006).
The task of providing a bureaucrat with right incentives is similar to the principal’s problem
in contract theory literature. Since Holmstrom (1979), it has emphasized the crucial role of in-
formation in resolving the moral hazard problem. Tirole (1986, 1992) considers a model where a
principal hires a supervisor to get information about agent’s eﬀorts; the problem is that the super-
visor can collude with the agent. Kofman and Lawarree (1993) extend Tirole’s model to compare
internal and external auditors. Like free media in our model, external auditors are costlier but,
at least in theory, never collude. Williamson (1967), Calvo and Wellisz (1978), and Qian (1994)
study incentives in hierarchies and suggest that monitoring costs and risks of collusion are crucial
for understanding the limits to eﬃciency of large organizations.
Prendergast (1993) builds a theory of “yes-men” which shows that whenever ﬁrms use subjective
performance evaluation, there endogenously arises a tendency for the subordinates to conform to
the boss’s opinion therefore undermining eﬃciency. Friebel and Raith (2004) model a three-tier
hierarchy where there is a risk of value destruction as the middle-manager fears competition from his
own subordinates and therefore is not willing to hire or promote the best talent. Friebel and Guriev
(2005) study the case of Enron and show that the earnings manipulation by the top management
may result in the spread of distorted information throughout corporate hierarchy and undermine
eﬃciency of incentive contracts. In the end of the day, Enron’s top management lost the ability
to monitor the performance even internally. A deputy CEO once complained: “With [Enron CFO
Andrew] Fastow, you could never tell whether [individual] deals were clean because they were too
complicated” (Maclean and Elkind, 2003, p. 152). The Enron case is also an illustration of the
importance of risks of collusion with auditors: the auditors (the Houston oﬃce of Arthur Andersen)
did not want to lose a generous client that paid Arthur Andersen hundreds of millions of dollars
in consulting fees. To avoid collusion, anti-trust authorities often oﬀer leniency arrangements for
cartel participants (Spagnolo, 2000). Similarly to our independent media, cartel participants cannot
commit to keep the relevant information from the public.
The diﬃculties of application of the basic agency theory to the analysis of incentives in govern-
ment bureaucracy is discussed in Wilson (1989) and formally analyzed in Dewatripont, Jewitt, and
Tirole (1999). Wilson (1989) emphasizes the importance of fuzziness of the mission and therefore
preponderance of career concerns over formal contracts. We instead focus on the mechanism of
26generating common knowledge information about the bureaucrat’s performance which is crucial for
the career concern model.
The economics-of-media literature is diverse and fast-growing. Sen (1999), Besley and Burgess
(2002), Besley and Prat (2006) emphasize the role of independent media in enhancing citizens’
ability to choose right politicians and policies. Reinikka and Svensson (2005) and Kaufman (2006)
show that media help to reduce corruption. Besley and Prat (2006) consider media capture in
democracies. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Baron (2006) construct models explaining the
observed media biases, while Petrova (2006) and Corneo (2006) explain the negative impact of
economic inequality on media freedom. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2006) demonstrate that in a mature
democracy increased political competition and extensive media coverage reduce political rents.
Using cross-country data on media ownership in 97 developing and developed countries, Djankov
et al. (2003) conclude that “worse” outcomes are correlated with state ownership of media; at the
same time, state ownership of all forms of media is much higher in less democratic countries. Dyck
and Zingales (2002) consider the situation where business reporting is endogenously biased; free
competitive media is the only way to commit not to collude with the source of exclusive information.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We study the determinants of media freedom in non-democratic societies. In such societies, the
ruler needs an independent source of information on the outcomes of his policies. Otherwise he
cannot provide incentives to his bureaucracy which may result in poor economic performance and
eventually cost him his job. The ruler may choose to allow media freedom or to build a secret service
that would report on the bureaucracy directly to him. In the latter case, there is a risk of collusion
between the monitor and the bureaucrat. The ruler can overcome collusion by providing high-
powered incentives to the monitor but it is costly. On the other hand, independent and competitive
media cannot commit not to provide this information to the citizens. Such leakage undermines the
very basis of the non-democratic regime: the collective action problem in organizing a revolution.
If citizens receive the same signal about the poor outcomes of the ruler’s policies, e.g. with the
help of mass media, they solve the coordination problem and overthrow the ruler. As the need to
provide incentives to bureaucracy is relatively less important in resource-rich countries, our theory
predicts a negative relationship between resource abundance and media freedom; this relationship
is especially strong in less democratic countries.
27Two authoritarian regimes seem to defy this logic: Belarus and China. Both are (relatively)
resource-poor and have tightly controlled media, while being apparently successful in terms of
economic growth. Our model helps to read these cases. Belarus has been receiving substantial
support from Russia, mostly in terms of heavily subsidized prices for oil and natural gas; BRATT
(2006) estimates the direct beneﬁts due to these subsidies on oil and gas prices alone at the level
of 15% Belarussian GDP. Essentially, Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarussian President can aﬀord
censorship and heavy reliance on secret service; the support from Russia provides suﬃcient rents
as if Belarus were a resource-rich country.14
In China, the ruling party is facing exactly the “Gorbachev dilemma” that is the focus of our
paper. On one hand, the tight control over the media stands in the way of attempts to improve
bureaucratic performance as the SARS story vividly demonstrated. On the other, free media would
have provided a challenge to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. One way to deal with the
information problem that has been followed by the Chinese leadership is to decentralize economic
decision-making and even introduce elections at municipal and provincial level. In principle, such
mechanisms might prevent nationwide information aggregation but for the very same reason they
only partially mitigate the incentive costs of censorship.
14We wrote the ﬁrst draft of this paper before the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus. Very well in line with our
argument, due to the complete absence of free media the opposition failed to gather suﬃcient number of protesters to
overthrow the President. Also, the failed attempt demonstrated the tangible risks for revolution participants. Many
protesters including both opposition presidential candidates were arrested and/or beaten up.
28Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
If constraint (3) is satisﬁed, or the ruler allows free media, the ruler will learn policy outcome
for sure. Bureaucrat’s low eﬀorts will lead to success with probability 0; in the case of high eﬀorts,
the probabilities are 1 and ν, respectively. He then chooses high eﬀorts if and only if expected
increase in payoﬀ exceeds costs c,i . e .(wS − wF) ≥ c or ν (wS − wF) ≥ c.T h e c h e a p e s t w a y t o
satisfy these constraints is by setting wF =0 ,a n dwS such that these expressions are satisﬁed as
equalities. Similarly, if secret service is used, the ruler should set zS = σ and hF = σ + wS.
We now can obtain the (minimum) expected payments that the ruler expects to pay in each of
these cases. Obviously, the ruler pays nothing if he chooses low-powered incentives. If he chooses
high-powered incentives for the bureaucrat together with free media, he pays c with probability 1
if he is able. If he is inept, he pays c/ν with probability ν, which also gives c in expectation. If
the ruler does not allow free media, but still opts to have high-powered incentives, he must pay
bureaucrat’s wage wS to the bureaucrat if the policy was successful and zF = wS to the secret
service if it fails. Hence, an able ruler pays c+σ while an inept one pays c/ν +σ, which is strictly
greater than in the case of free media.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
After the ﬁrst period, those who received si = L want the ruler to be replaced, but they know
that if a = aH, the revolt will fail (assumption (2) implies for n =1that 1 − α<γ ), so they do
not revolt. Assume that revolt is possible and consider the earliest time since beginning of tenure
when citizens can revolt. (Since revolt in previous periods is impossible, citizens do not update
o nt h ef a c tt h a ti td i dn o to c c u r ,w h i c hs i m p l i ﬁes arithmetic a lot.) Suppose that the number of
periods passed is n, so each individual got n private and n public signals, public signals being all
about success. For each individual, participation in an unsuccessful revolt costs r and participation
in a successful one is costless. To participate, the individual must know for sure that revolt will
succeed, and, in particular, he needs to know that there are enough fellow citizens who believe that
the ruler is able with probability less than µ and want him replaced.
How an individual may know for sure that the share of citizens who believe the ruler is less
able than average is suﬃciently high (at least γ)? Indeed, it is possible for an individual to get a
stream of n positive public signals and any combination of private signals even if the ruler is inept.
Hence, an individual always assigns positive probability to ruler being able (she does not update
29on the fact of absence of revolt in previous periods). To be positive that revolt, if occurs, succeeds,
the individual must be certain that even if the ruler is able, there are suﬃciently many citizens
who believe that he is inept and want him replaced. Now consider the set of citizens who want to
remove the ruler. If a citizen who received j negative signals (out of n) wants the ruler replaced
then, obviously, a citizen who received more than j also does (Bayes’ formula yields that getting a
negative private signal instead of a positive one decreases the person’s subjective probability that
the ruler is able). Now assume that even if the ruler is able, there are indeed at least γ citizens
who want the ruler replaced. We will show that this leads to a contradiction: namely, the “least
certain” citizen, i.e. one who would not want the ruler to be replaced had he received one less
negative signal, actually does not want to revolt.
To make matters simple, consider the set of citizens who would be willing to revolt if they
had their private signals only. This set is even larger than those who are willing to revolt after
taking both public and private signals into account, since public signals are positive and, by Bayes’
formula, only improve the perception of ruler’s abilities. If the ruler is able, the share of citizens




αn−j (1 − α)
j . Assume that those who got at least k
negative signals want to revolt, while those who got k − 1 or less do not (evidently, those who got
all positive signals believe that the ruler is able with probability greater than µ and thus want to
keep him, so k>0; on the other hand, since we assumed that some citizens do want the ruler
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j ≥ γ,
and, from assumption (2),t h a tk<(1 − α)n, i.e. the “least certain” citizen should have more
negative private signals than expectation of those. If the ruler is inable, the probability of this
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The ﬁrst value is greater than the latter if and only if f (α) >f(α),w h e r e
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k. This means that the citizen is more likely to get
30exactly k negative signals if the ruler is able than if he is inept. Bayes’ formula implies that such
citizen should believe that the ruler is able with probability higher than µ b a s e do nh i sp r i v a t e
signals; so, this happens if he takes positive public signals into account as well. This contradicts
the fact that citizen who received k negative signals is willing to see the ruler replaced. Therefore,
it is impossible for a citizen to be certain that more than γ other citizens want the ruler replaced,
and hence he would prefer not to revolt. Hence, there is no minimum period in which citizens may
revolt if all public signals during current ruler’s tenure were positive. This contradiction completes
the proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
If an able ruler chooses a high-powered incentive scheme, there is never a revolt. Evidently,
choosing secret service is strictly dominated by free media with high incentives, so we need to
compare the latter with no incentives regimes. By providing no incentives (apart from a chance
of revolt) the ruler loses l because of a chance of policy failure while gaining c by economizing on
bureaucrat’s wage. By assumption (1). It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium utility of
an able ruler is given by Bellman equation
Ua = u − c + βUa,
implying Ua =( 1− β)
−1 (u − c).
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .
We need to compare the derivatives with regard to u, l, σ,a n dc in each of these expressions.












∂l . This means that as if parameters are such that M was chosen, then an
increase in l cannot change this, however, if M was not chosen, it may be chosen after the increase,
so the set of other parameters where M is chosen is strictly larger for higher l. The same reasoning
leads to the proof of the statement for other variables (to prove that M dominates L one needs to
recall that η<1 − ν).
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37Table 1. Regression estimates. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 OLS  IV  Panel 
  Media Freedom, averaged 1993-2004  Media Freedom 
3.79 3.99 0.65 5.42 5.61  3.4  5.38 5.38  Log GDP per 
capita, PPP  (1.04)*** (1.06)***  -2.45  (1.78)*** (1.67)*** (1.22)*** (1.88)***  -3.59 
4.57 4.32 4.04  4.1  3.14 4.95 1.26 1.26  Democracy 
(0.30)*** (0.35)*** (0.61)*** (0.56)*** (0.48)*** (0.39)*** (0.28)*** (0.42)*** 
-2.67  -4.2  -7.56 -3.97 -6.14 -1.83 -3.53 -3.53  Log oil reserves 
(0.83)*** (1.02)*** (2.49)*** (1.16)*** (1.40)*** (0.71)** (1.35)***  (1.95)* 
  0.39 0.78 0.46 0.39    0.41 0.41  Log oil reserves 
* Democracy    (0.15)***  (0.36)** (0.19)** (0.19)**    (0.16)**  (0.25)* 
-1.88 -1.96 -1.62 -2.04 -2.07        Log population, 
1992  (0.68)***  (0.67)*** (1.13)  (1.04)* (0.93)**       
1.51 1.37 1.84 1.46 2.41        Log land area 
(0.57)***  (0.56)**  (0.86)**  (0.93)  (0.83)***     
   -0.32        Literacy rate, 
Databanks Int.     (0.10)***       
   -0.06        Gini, WDI 
   (0.12)       
   5.53        Log Internet 
users, WDI     (1.56)***       
Observations 121  121 65  34 108 97  1380  1380 
R-squared  0.81 0.82 0.81 0.93 0.69 0.82 0.10 0.10 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Notes: Regressions (1)-(5) are OLS. (1) is basic regression; in (2) we add interaction term; in (3) we introduce other controls which, however, limit our sample. 
In (4) we run the same specification as (2) on the subsample of countries with non-trivial oil reserves. In (5) we use lagged democracy (averaged 1980-1992) 
instead of contemporaneous democracy. In (6) we instrument democracy (averaged 1993-2003) by lagged democracy (averaged 1980-1992), while. In panel 
regressions (7) and (8) fixed effects are included; in (8) we also control for clustering at the country level. 
In cross-sectional regressions (1)-(6), Log GDP per capita PPP, Log oil reserves, and Log population are for year 1992; Democracy (alone and in interaction 
term) is averaged for the period 1993-2003 in (1)-(5) and 1980-1992 in (6). Data for Internet users are for year 2003. In panel regressions (7) and (8) all variables 
are for current year. Dependent variable is (100 – media freedom, Freedom House), averaged for years 1993-2004 in columns (1)-(6). Table 2. Robustness checks. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 OLS  IV 
  Media Freedom, Freedom House, except for (4) with Reporters Sans Frontières 
1.14 6.12 3.42 1.91 1.54 4.92 1.64  Log GDP per 
capita, PPP  (1.75) (1.43)***  (1.03)*** (1.63) (1.49)  (1.05)***  (2.06) 
4.22 6.18 4.38 3.86 4.38 4.22 4.11  Democracy 
(0.43)*** (2.35)** (0.40)***  (0.53)*** (0.31)*** (0.44)*** (0.66)*** 
-2.48 1.37    -6.08 -2.66 -3.21 -2.27  Log oil reserves 
(1.08)**  (1.26)    (1.68)*** (0.90)*** (1.13)***  (1.18)* 
    0.64    0.26    Log oil reserves * 
Democracy      (0.22)***    (0.15)*   
   -1.53       Log oil production 
   (0.58)**      
   0.14       Log oil production 
* Democracy     (0.07)**      
Observations  77  44 125  115 80 121 56 
R-squared  0.63 0.58 0.82 0.65 0.77 0.84 0.64 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Notes: Regressions (1)-(6) are OLS. (1) is for subsample of non-democratic countries (democracy averaged for years 1993-2003 is at most 8), (2) is for 
subsample of democratic countries (democracy greater that 8). In regression (3) we put oil production instead of oil reserves, and in (4) we use media freedom 
data from Reporters Sans Frontières instead of Freedom House. In (5), OECD and former communist countries are excluded, and in (6) we control for regional 
dummies (8 regions total). In (7) we instrument democracy (averaged 1993-2003) by lagged democracy (averaged 1980-1992) for a subsample of non-
democratic countries. 
Log GDP per capita PPP, Log oil reserves, Log oil production, and Log population are for year 1992; Democracy (alone and in interaction term) is averaged for 
the period 1993-2003. Data for Internet users are for year 2003. Dependent variable is (100 – media freedom, Freedom House), averaged for years 1993-2004 in 
columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) and (100 – media freedom, Reporters Sans Frontières) for year 2004 in column (4). 